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PUBLICATION OF PROCESS IN ATTACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS
It would seem that a change introduced in the attachment
statutes by the Revised Code has created a situation of uncertainty
with reference to a matter that was formerly definitely settled by
statute in this state. In the former Code, it was definitely and
specifically prescribed that the attachment should be levied before
the order of publication should be made.
"When any attachment, except under the third section, is
returned executed, an order of publication, as prescribed in
chapter one hundred and twenty-four shall be made against
the defendant against whom the claim is, unless he has been
served with a copy of the attachment or with process in the
suit in which the attachment is issued."'
In the Revised Code, the following section was substituted for
the section above.
1 W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 106, § 17.
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"In any proceeding under this article process commencing
the action shall be served upon the attachment debtor, and may
be served in any manner provided in article three, chapter
fifty-sx of this Code for serving process commencing a suit." '2
The reason for this substitution is explained in the following
Revisers' Note.
"Section 17, c. 106, Code 1923, apparently dispensed with
service of process commencing the suit, upon the defendant,
if he was served with a copy of the attachment. This section
requires service of such process in some manner authorized
by law, in all cases."
It may be suspected that the draftsman of the substituted
section was laboring under a misapprehension, both as to the object
of the original section and as to the necessity of the procedural re-
quirements sought to be imposed by the substituted section.
In this state, an attachment proceeding is an ancillary proceed-
ing in aid of an action, suit or other primary proceeding pending
at the time when the attachment is issued. An attachment can not
issue until the action, suit or other primary proceeding which it is
intended to aid has been started.3 Normally, an action or suit in
this state is started by issuance of a summons (in chancery nomen-
clature, a subpena) .4 In a suit against a nonresident, where the
proceeding is directly in rem, it may be instituted wholly by pub-
lication of process, without the issuance of any summons which
would contemplate personal service on the defendant.' It will be
noted, however, that, under the former statute quoted above, where
jurisdiction of the res was sought only through the medium of an
attachment, the action or suit could not in any case be started by
an order of publication. There could be no order of publication
until the attachment had been returned executed and there could be
2 W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) e. 38, art. 7, § 30.
a Id. at c. 38, art. 7, § 1.
4 Id. at c. 56, art. 3, § 4; Oil and Gas Well Supply Co. v. Gartlan, 58 W. Va.
267, 52 S. E. 524 (1905) ; United States Blowpipe Co. v. Spencer, 46 W. Va. 590,
33 S. E. 342 (1899). In a proceeding upon notice of motion for judgment,
'he suit is started when the notice is returned to and filed in the clerk's office.
'harlton v. Pancake, 98 W. Va. 363, 127 S. E. 70 (1925); The Citizens Na-
tional Bank of Phillipi v. Auvil, 109 W. Va. 753, 156 S. E. 111 (1930).
5As in a suit to enforce a lien against property where the lien exists inde-
pendently of the proceeding to enforce it. Augir v. Warder, 74 W. Va. 103,
81 S. E. 708 (1914). The same principle should control in other proceedings
where the remedy and relief sought primarily affect the res, as in suits for
partition, to remove cloud from title, etc. In an attachment proceeding, the
primary relief sought is satisfaction of a personal claim. The acquisition and
enforcement of the attachment lien against property is secondary and col-
lateral.
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no attacnent until the action or suit had been started. Conse-
quently, the action or suit, in order to warrant an attachment,
must have been instituted by some procedure other than an order
of publication. The practice pursued, according to the writer's
observation, has been to have a summons issued (although there is
no expectation of having it served) in order to start a suit as a
condition precedent to attachment, have the attachment issued and
levied, and then to proceed with the order of publication. In
other words, actions or suits involving attachments (excluding pro-
ceedings on notice of motion for judgment" and cases where ap-
pearances dispense with process) are always started by issuance of
a summons. Hence it could not have been the intention of the
former statute to dispense with the issuance of original process in
an action or suit involving an attachment.
Assuming that the draftsman of the substituted section was
willing to concede, on the basis of the demonstration attempted
above, that the original section did not dispense with the issuance
of process, he still may have been of the opinion that, after the is-
suance of the process, the statute dispensed with its service and
permitted, in lieu thereof, service in any case of a copy of the
attachment. However, it is believed that such a concept would
be based on a misapprehension as to the object of the original sec-
tion.
Certainly, our whole system of jurisprudence and procedure
contemplates that process, once issued, shall be personally served,
if practicable. Publication of process through the medium of an
order of publication is contemplated only as a lame substitute for
personal service; lame for the plaintiff because it limits the effect
of his judgment, and lame for the defendant because it may never
give him any actual notice. The statute permits such a procedure
only in those instances where it is not practicable to obtain per-
sonal service." A careful reading of the original section, quoted
first above, will indicate that it did not at all attempt to dispense
with personal service where such a method of service was prac-
ticable. It permitted a resort to publication only in those cases
0 See note 4 supra.
7Where (1) the defendant is a nonresident, (2) where the plaintiff can not
determine in what county he is, (3) where two reasonable attempts have been
made to serve him personally without avail, and (4) where the defendant is a
foreign corporation and no person is found within the state who may properly
be served on its behalf. W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 56, art. 3, § 23.
3
Carlin: Publication of Process in Attachment Proceedings
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1940
EDITORIAL NOTES
where the statute generally provides for such a procedure ;8 in other
words, where personal service could not reasonably be expected.
Its whole object was (1) to fix the time when an order of publication
might be made - after the attachment had been returned executed;
and (2) to prescribe a substitute for the order of publication -
service with a copy of th' order of attachment or with process - but
not to prescribe a substitute for personal service of process in a case
where an order of publication was not proper. In other words,
service with a copy of the attachment was not in any sense a sub-
stitute for personal service, where personal service was practicable,
but merely a substitute for an order of publication. To the extent
that service with a copy of the attachment was a substitute for
publication of process, it would seem to be a very commendable
substitute. It would seem that a defendant would be much more
likely to receive adequate notice from such a personal service than
he would from a publication which he might never see.
So far as the substituted section merely eliminates service of
a copy of the attachment as an alternative to an order of publi-
cation, its effect may not be very important. If the plaintiff has
an opportunity to find the defendant within the jurisdiction, so
that he could be served with a copy of the attachment, it would
seem that he would have an equal opportunity to serve him per-
sonally with process, and so dispense with An order of publication.
But the substituted section involves a further elimination from the
original section, whether purposely or through inadvertence,
which entails more serious consequences. As has already been
noted, the original section fixed the time of the order of publi-
cation. The order bf publication was to be made after the attach-
ment had been returned executed. The substituted section is utter-
ly silent as to the time when the order may be made, and there is
no other provision in the Code which fixes the time. What is the
effect of this omission?
8 There is nothing in the attachment statutes which prescribes the conditions
upon which an order of publication may be awarded except the reference to the
section cited in the preceding note.
9 It might be surmised that the omission was inadvertent, in view of the fact
that it is not mentioned in the Revisers' Note. The new section provides that
process "may be served in any manner provided in article three, chapter
fifty-six", which of course includes publication of process. Hence it may have
been assumed that the provision quoted was a precise substitute for the provi-
sion in the old section relating to an order of publication, the draftsman losing
sight of the fact that the article referred to fixes no time for entry of the
order of publication, or being unaware that there may be peculiar reasons for
fixing the time in an attachment proceeding which do not prevail where the
proceeding is directly n -rem, as noted in note 5 supra.
4
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According to the usual rules of statutory construction, the
elimination of this specific requirement would mean that it is no
longer necessary to execute the attachment before entering the order
of publication and proceeding to execute it. If this is the result con-
templated by the new section, is it constitutionally valid? Or if the
object of the elimination is merely to neutralize the statute, with
the intention of permitting the time of the levy and the time of the
publication to be fixed by general legal principles, are there rea-
sons why, independently of any statute, it will still be necessary to
resort to the old statutory practice, regardless of the elimination
made by the new section? Or if there are no requirements.
statutory or otherwise, making levy of the attachment a condition
precedent to the order of publication, are there any other standards
which make essential any particular times for these procedural
events? Experience in other states would indicate that such ques-
tions as these must now receive consideration in this state in or-
der to determine the proper procedure when an attachment is based
on an order of publication. To the extent that these questions may
be answered, the answers depend upon foreign decisions and are
by no means devoid of difficulties.
Service by publication is a statutory device and is unknown
to the common law.10 When the practice was first made available
by statute, its jurisdictional limitations were not clearly under-
stood. In fact, it seems to have been naively accepted as an abso-
lute substitute for personal service and so recognized as a proper
basis for the rendition of purely personal judgments and decrees,
the idea that it could serve only as the basis for a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem being a later development in the law.1 Although
it is now generally accepted as a fundamental principle that a
judgment or decree can not be rendered on a mere publication of
process unless the court in some way has jurisdiction of a res or
something in the nature of a res, this conclusion has not been
reached without much conflict in the decisions as to what facts are
sufficient to constitute the jurisdiction and at what stage of the
proceeding the jurisdictional facts must exist. When seizure of
a res is recognized as the fact which establishes the jurisdiction,
the controversy is concerned with the time of the seizure.
Essentially, the problem seems to resolve itself into an inquiry
whether the seizure is merely a condition precedent to the rendition
20 See Hartzel v. Vigen, 6 N. D. 117, 69 N. W. 203, 66 Am. St. Rep. 589, 35
L. R. A. 451(1896).
11 Idem.
5
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of judgment, or whether it is a condition precedent, not only to
the rendition of judgment, but also to the antecedent procedure
upon which the judgment is based; in other words, whether it is
essential only that the judgment be directed against a res then
brought within the control of the court, or whether the whole pro-
cedure, at every stage, must be directed against a res then under
the court's control.' 2
In attachment cases, to which the present discussion is con-
fined, there is little disagreement as to the necessity of seizure of
the attachment res at some time before judgment. It is now general-
ly held that a court has no jurisdiction to render judgment in an
attachment proceeding based solely on an order of publication
unless the attachment res has been subjected to some method of
seizure and so brought within the jurisdiction of the court before
judgment. 3 As to whether seizure is further necessary as a con-
dition precedent to the procedure prior to judgment, there is no
little controversy. It has been variously held (1) that jurisdiction
to entertain the suit and proceed with the publication of process
is "acquired by filing the petition, affidavit and bond," without
any levy upon the attachment res; 1 that the mere fact that the
attachment res is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
gives the court jurisdiction to proceed without a levy;"' (3) that
levy upon the attachment res is a prerequisite to the publication of
process.'6
In some jurisdictions where the controversy has not been set-
tled by considerations hereinafter mentioned, the decisions have
been controlled by constructions which the courts have placed up-
on an ambiguous phrase which occurs in many of the statutes, to
the effect that the court may proceed with the publication of
process when it has "jurisdiction of the subject of the action".I T
Some courts have construed the words "subject of the action" to
12 "There are two theories, both supported by authority. One is that, since
the judgment is essentially in rem, the seizure must be made before the process
is issued for the substituted service. The other is that seizure at any time
before rendition of judgment is sufficient to confer jurisdiction." Porter v.
Duke, 34 Ariz. 217, 270 Pae. 625 (1928).
"s See cases cited in three prior notes and cases cited hereinafter.
14 Tufts v. Volkening, 122 Mo. 631, 27 S. W. 522 (1894).
'5, "The essential fact upon which jurisdiction is made to depend is, property
of the defendant in the state, and not whether it has been attached." Jarvis
v. Barrett, 14 Wis. 642 (*591, 1861). Accord: Closson v. Chase, 158 Wis. 346,
149 N. W. 26 (1914).
16 See note 12 supra and cases cited in note 22 infra.
17 See the dissenting opinion of Corliss, J., in Hartzel v. Vigen, 6 N. D. 117,
69 N. W. 203 (1896).
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mean "action" or "cause of action", while other courts have con-
strued them to mean the res or property which is the subject of the
attachment, and hence have reached the conclusion that acquiring
"jurisdiction of the subject of the action" means a levy upon the
attachment res.'8 Since there is no such statute in West Virginia,
the problems involved must be settled in this state on other con-
siderations.
In the midst of the controversy among the state courts, as out-
lined above, came a famous decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States, Pennoyer v. Neff, 1'9 which influenced the whole
future drift of the controversy. Since the influence of this case
so thoroughly permeates the holdings in subsequent decisions, it
will be advisable, before proceeding further, to analyze definitely
the scope of its adjudication and the reasoning upon which it is
based.
The plaintiff, Pennoyer, owned land in the state of Oregon.
He was a nonresident of that state. Mitchell sued him in an Oregon
state court to recover an attorney's fee. Pennoyer was not per-
sonally served with process and he made no appearance to the ac-
tion. A personal judgment was taken against him for-the amount
of the claim, based wholly on a publication of process. Thereafter,
land which Pennoyer owned in Oregon was sold under an execution
issued upon this judgment, and was purchased by the present de-
fendant Neff. The present action was brought by Pennoyer against
Neff to recover the land, on the theory that the judgment taken by
Mitchell against Pennoyer was void because there was no personal
service on, or appearance by Pennoyer, and there was no attach-
ment or other seizure of the land before judgment to form the
-basis of a judgment in rem, and therefore Neff's title was void.
Held, that the Oregon judgment in favor of Mitchell was void, for
the reasons stated, and that Neff got no title under the execution
sale.
It should be noted that what the court actually decided in this
case, since there was no seizure of the property until after judgment,
was that there could be no personal judgment on a mere publication
of process and that there, could be no judgment in rem unless the
property was seized before judgment. These facts have been seized
upon by some of the state courts in order to minimize the effect of
Peniwjer v. Neff, by way of holding that there is no particular
time before judgment atf which the property must be seized, but
8 ]b.
19 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).
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that seizure at any time before judgment is sufficient. *Wherefore
it is important to analyze the principles upon which the 'decision is
based and seek to determine whether they have a broader appli-
cation than the( minimum which was necessary to dispose of the
facts to which they were actually applied.
If the court is to be understood as requiring that the property
shall be seized merely at some time before judgment, the following
statements may be taken as a fair exposition of the rule.
"The want of authority of the tribunals of a state to
adjudicate upon the obligations of non-residents, where they
have no property within its limits, is not denied by the court
below; but the position is assumed that, where they have
property within the state, it is immaterial whether the proper-
ty is in the first instance brought under the control of the court
by attachment or some equivalent act, and afterwards applied
by its judgment to the satisfaction of demands against its
owner; or such demands be first established in a personal ac-
tion, and the property of the non-resident be afterwards
seized and sold on execution. But the answer to this position
has already been given in the statement, that the jurisdiction
of the court to inquire into and determine his obligation at
all is only incidental to its jurisdiction over the property.
Its jurisdiction in that respect cannot be made to depend upon
facts to be ascertained after it has tried the cause and rendered
judgment."
This bare statement of the rule, standing alone, might be taken
as indicating an intention to prescribe a more or less artificial re-
quirement for the mere purpose of making a formal distinction
between judgments in rem and judgments in personam. That the
requirement, at least in most cases, would be wholly artificial, if
seizure of the property immediately before judgment is held suf-
ficient, would seem to be beyond controversy. However, the court
does not stop with these statements, but states practical reasons
for its decision which would not be satisfied by mere seizure of the
property at any time before judgment. After calling attention to
the fact that, in the great majority of cases, where process against
a party is published, he will never have seen the publication, the
court makes the following statements.
"Substituted service by publication, or in any other
authorized form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the ob-
ject of the proceedings taken where property is once brought
under control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act.
The law assumes that property is always in the possession of
8
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its owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the
theory that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is
taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to
any proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its
condemnation and sale."
This is not a positive statement that the reason for the rule
requires seizure of the property before publication of process, al-
though it may be surmised that such was what the court had in
mind, whether basing the requirement on formal jurisdictional
prerequisites or on the necessity of giving adequate notice to the
defendant. Whether it is possible to satisfy reasons upon which
the rule is intended to be based by seizure of the property after
the order of publication is made but some time before judgment,
would seem to depend upon what the court requires by way of
jurisdiction to proceed in rem. If the rule intended is predicated
on assumption by the court that not only the judgment, but like-
wise the whole procedure leading up to the judgment, must be in
rem against a res continuously under control of the court, then. of
course the publication. of process, being a part of the procedure,
must be preceded by seizure of the res. On the other hand, if the
requirements of jurisdiction to proceed in rem will be satisfied by
a mere seizure before judgment, and an earlier seizure is required
only for the practical purpose of giving notice to the defendant,
then it does not necessarily follow that the seizure must precede
the publication, but a seizure after publication (or at least after
publication has started) but a reasonable time before judgment
may be sufficient. On which one of these considerations the court
intended to place primary emphasis, or whether it intended to base
its decision on both, as' equally decisive or meaning the same thing,
is not clear. It may have assumed (if it did so assume) that the
seizure must precede the publication because the whole procedure
must be in rem, or it may have indulged in this assumption in order
to provide a means of insuring that the seizure shall be made a
sufficient time before judgment to give the defendant adequate no-
tice. If the latter consideration is the controlling one, then it may
result that seizure after publication, but within a reasonable time
before judgment, will be sufficient.
With reference to the binding force of the principles an-
nounced in Pennoyer v. Neff on the procedure ini state courts, it
should be noted that the judgment attacked in that case had been
rendered before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The court indicates that the principles
9
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announced in Pennoyer v. Neff should apply with still greater force
since the adoption of this amendment.
"Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments may
be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the state re-
sisted on the ground that the proceedings in a court of justice
to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due
process of law."
Since the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, a few of the courts have
wholly- ignored it in determining the time when an attachment
must be levied when the proceeding is based on publication of
process. 0 Most state courts, however, have considered themselves
bound by it and the inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
although the results reached and the views expressed are by no
means in accord as to the restrictions which it imposes. Some
courts hold that Pennoyer v. Neff will be satisfied with seizure of
the res at any time before judgment ;-1 others hold that the res must
be attached before publication of process. 22  It would seem sur-
prising that there has not been more inclination, by way of com-
promise between these two views, to hold that attachment after
publication but . a reasonable time before judgment is sufficient.23
If Pennoyer v. Neff undertakes to impose a requirement which
will be of any substantial benefit at all to the defendant, in lieu
of catering to a bare formality, it would seem that it must at the
least contemplate levy of the attachment a sufficient time before
judgment to give the defendant adequate notice to prepare a de-
fense in opposition to entry of the judgment. This may be accom-
plished in two ways. The time of the levy may be fixed with ref.
erence to the time of the publication of process, as under the
20 Tufts v. Volkening, 122 Mo. 631, 27 S. W. 522 (1894); State cx rel. Bank
of Herrick v. Circuit Court of Gregory County, 32 S. D. 573, 143 N. W. 892
(1913); Closson v. Chase, 158 Wis. 346, 149 N. W. 26 (1914). Each of these
cases holds that the order of publication may precede the levy of the attach-
ment.
21 Porter v. Duke, 34 Ariz. 217, 270 Pac. 625 (1928) ; Hartzel v. Vigen, 6 N.
D. 117, 69 N. W. 203 (1896); dissenting opinion in Little v. Christie, 69 S. C.
57, 48 S. E. 89 (1903).
22fDimmerling v. Andrews, 236 N. Y. 43, 139 N. E. 774 (1923); Hartzel v.
Vigen, dissenting opinion, 6 N. D. 117, 69 N. W. 203 (1896); Little v. Christie,
69 S. C. 57, 48 S. E. 89 (1903); Cosh-M'Lurray Co. v. Tuttich. 10 Wash. 449,
38 Pac. 1134 (1895); Baumgardner v. Bono Fertilizer Co., 58 Fed. 1 (C. C. W.
D. Va. 1893). The last case is based on Pennoyer v. Neff and the Virginia
statute.
23 See dissenting opinion in Hartzel v. Vigen, 6 N. D. 117, 67 N. W. 203
(1896), expressing the view that Pennoyer v. Neff would be satisfied by such
a standard.
10
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former West Virginia statute, or it may be fixed with reference to
the time of entry of the judgment. In either case, it would seem
desirable to have the time definitely fixed by, statute, in order to
relieve litigants from the uncertainty that will prevail, and the
courts from the troublesome task that they must assume, if the
courts are required in each case to determine what is a reasonable
time. Some courts have got rid ofi the uncertainty, at the same
time insuring that they will not contravene any restrictions im-
posed by Pennoyer v. Neff, by construingthat case as requiring
levy of the attachment before publication of process. 24  In New
York, after a period of uncertainty as, to the meaning of Pennoyer
v. Neff, the uncertainty was resolved by express statutory require-
ment that levy of the attachment precede the publication of
process.2 1
LEo CARI, .
NOTE ON STATHAM'S ABRIDGMENT
For three centuries or so, it has been customary among legal
historians to admit a woeful lack of knowledge when it came to
identifying the compiler of Statham's Abridgment.' Professional
tradition originally ascribed the work to Nicholas Statham,2 but
24 See cases cited in note 22 supra.
25 Dimmerling v. Andrews, 236 N. Y. 43, 139 N. E. 774 (1923).
1WINFIELD, CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (1925) 206: "We
shall speak of Statham's Abridgment in order to avoid constant periphrasis,
but, so far as we know, there is no direct proof, external or internal, that
Statham compiled it. In fact, we have no positive knowledge of who was the
author or of the date of the printing of the book. What we know of Statham
himself is little enough. Even his Christian name is uncertain, and so is the
spelling of his surname."
2 DUGDALE, ORIGINES JURIDIcIATES (1666) 58; 2 HoLDSwORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1923) 543; RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HiS-
TORY (1936) 321. The issue as to authorship arises out of the absence of any
title-page, as well as the complete lack of evidence within the printed book
itself regarding the editorial source.
Y. B. 4 Edw. II, SELDEN SOcIETY, vol. 26 (1914) INTRODUCTION by G.. J.
TURNER, xxi-xcii: "Statham 's Abridgment has been generally assigned to a
certain Nicholas Stathan, a member of Lincoln's Inn who became Lent reader
of that Society in 1471 and died in the following year. His book probably
printed at Rouen about eighteen years after his death by Guillaume le Tailleur
for Richard Pynson of London, though quite possibly printed in London by
Pynson himself, is remarkable as being, apart from a few Year Books, our
earliest printed law book. Though generally described in catalogues as an
'Abridgment of Cases to the end of K. Henry VI.,' it has in fact no title-page,
and its authorship can only be deduced from the fact that it was 'consistently
described as 'Statham' by writers and reporters of the sixteenth century ....
It may be observed, however that it contains a few notes of cases of the reign
11
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